By Stephen M. Walt
Stephen M.
Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of
international relations at Harvard University Voice
“There is also something new about what is going on. Great powers
have long taken advantage of weaker societies, but today, the
weak are sometimes able to hit back at the great power’s
homeland. Britain, France, Belgium, and other countries used to
treat their colonial subjects in brutal and sometimes murderous
ways, but the colonized peoples had no way to attack their
colonial masters back in the imperial heartland. Today, groups
like al Qaeda and the Islamic State can do just that, no matter
how many precautions we take. That is the new reality we are now
struggling to absorb.”
Don’t Give ISIS What It Wants
” It is also, however, an
unfortunate but understandable response to decades (or even
centuries) of Western interference in the Middle East, and
especially to the policies that have taken the lives of hundreds
of thousands
of people in
the region.” “At the same time, to pretend that American and
European actions have nothing whatsoever to do with this problem
is to bury one’s head in the sand and ignore the obvious.
To note just one example of the West’s own role in
creating this problem: Had the United States refrained from
invading Iraq back in 2003, there almost certainly would be no
Islamic State today. ”
“We have to face facts squarely: Decades of misguided U.S. and
European policies have left many people in the Arab and Islamic
world deeply angry at and resentful toward the West. Those
policies include the West’s cozy coddling of various Arab
dictators, its blind support for Israel’s brutal policies
toward the Palestinians, and its own willingness to wage air
campaigns, employ sanctions, or invade Middle Eastern countries
whenever it thinks doing so suits its short-term interest.
Consider how we would react if some foreign power had been doing
similar things to us — and not just once but over many
years. Unsurprisingly, among those many angry people are a few
— fortunately, only a few — who decide to try to
pay back the West for what they regard as illegitimate and
murderous interference. Their response is morally despicable and
will solve nothing, but it should not be all that difficult to
fathom.”
Ensure that cooler heads prevail after an attack, resist the urge
for retribution, and other ways to make sure the terrorists
don’t win.
* By Stephen M. Walt
Stephen M.
Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of
international relations at Harvard University. *
November 16, 2015 * *
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[Don’t Give ISIS What It Wants ]
When a shocking event like the Paris attacks occurs, we know how
the world will respond. There will be dismay, an outpouring of
solidarity and sympathy, defiant speeches by politicians, and a
media frenzy. Unfortunately, these familiar reactions give the
perpetrators some of what they want: attention for their cause
and the possibility their targets will do something that
unwittingly helps advance the perpetrators’ radical aims.
What is most needed in such moments is not anger, outrage, or
finger-pointing, but calm resolution, cool heads, and careful
thought. What happened in Paris is an untold tragedy for the
victims and deeply offensive to all we hold dear, but we must
respond with our heads and not just our hearts. Here are five
lessons to bear in mind as we reassess the dangers and search for
an effective response.
No. 1: Keep the threat in perspective.
The sudden and violent deaths of some 130 innocent people in a
peaceful city invariably grips our attention. But an event like
this cannot shake the foundations of society unless we let it.
The deaths in Paris last Friday, Nov. 13, are tragic, but these
and similar incidents pale in comparison with the carnage and
inhumanity Europe suffered from either 1914 to 1918 or 1939 to
1945. For all its current troubles, Europe today is richer,
freer, safer, more open, more equal, and more stable than it has
been since any other time in its history, and those achievements
must not be surrendered. If France or its neighbors turn their
backs on what has been built in Europe over the past 60 years, it
will be a victory the attackers would welcome but most
emphatically do not deserve.
Let us also remember that other cities and societies have
experienced similar events yet are thriving today. New York,
Oslo, London, Boston, Madrid, Paris, Ankara, and several other
cities have faced costly terrorist attacks in recent years, yet
one visits them today and finds communities that have rebuilt and
recovered and are doing just fine. As we mourn the dead, we
should take comfort in knowing that terrorism is a weapon of the
weak and thus can have only a limited material impact on its
targets. The City of Light will be here and thriving long after
those who ordered these attacks are gone and mostly forgotten.
No. 2: Accept that 100 percent security is not possible.
As one would expect, a number of countries have responded to the
attacks by closing borders and implementing other short-term
measures. Efforts to improve intelligence will surely be
undertaken as well. These steps make sense as a way of reassuring
a worried public and helping to limit further terrorist strikes.
But there is no way to defend society against every extremist who
is willing to kill others and die in the process. As I’ve
argued at length
before, every modern society
contains an unlimited number of soft targets and we cannot guard
all of them. Even strong authoritarian states such as Russia and
China have experienced large-scale terrorist violence, which
tells you that stricter police-state methods wouldn’t
eliminate the problem. Regrettably, events such as the Paris
attacks will remain a recurring feature of 21st-century life. But
to repeat: They are not an existential threat.
No. 3: Defeating extremism requires understanding its origins.
We cannot hope to reduce the danger from this sort of violent
extremism if we do not understand and acknowledge its
origins.We cannot hope to reduce the danger from this sort of
violent extremism if we do not understand and acknowledge its
origins. Contrary to the writings of contemporary Islamophobes
, jihadi violence is not intrinsic to Islam. The Quran
explicitly forbids attacks
on innocent noncombatants, and the vast majority of devout
Muslims around the world utterly reject such actions. To blame
these attacks on “Islam” is like blaming
Christianity for the killings committed by Anders Breivik
in Oslo or holding Judaism
responsible for Baruch Goldstein
’s
murderous rampage in Hebron.
Rather, jihadi terrorism is a political movement based on a
minority’s narrow and fundamentalist interpretation of
Islam. To some extent, the emergence of groups such as the
Islamic State or the original al Qaeda is symptomatic of the
broader legitimacy and governance crisis in the Arab and Islamic
world. It is also, however, an unfortunate but understandable
response to decades (or even centuries) of Western interference
in the Middle East, and especially to the policies that have
taken the lives of hundreds of thousands
of people in
the region.
To acknowledge this fact in no way justifies what happened in
Paris, and I am most certainly not defending, excusing, or
rationalizing what the attackers did last Friday or what other
terrorists have done before. At the same time, to pretend that
American and European actions have nothing whatsoever to do with
this problem is to bury one’s head in the sand and ignore
the obvious. To note just one example of the West’s own
role in creating this problem: Had the United States refrained
from invading Iraq back in 2003, there almost certainly would be
no Islamic State today.
We have to face facts squarely: Decades of misguided U.S. and
European policies have left many people in the Arab and Islamic
world deeply angry at and resentful toward the West. Those
policies include the West’s cozy coddling of various Arab
dictators, its blind support for Israel’s brutal policies
toward the Palestinians, and its own willingness to wage air
campaigns, employ sanctions, or invade Middle Eastern countries
whenever it thinks doing so suits its short-term interest.
Consider how we would react if some foreign power had been doing
similar things to us — and not just once but over many
years. Unsurprisingly, among those many angry people are a few
— fortunately, only a few — who decide to try to
pay back the West for what they regard as illegitimate and
murderous interference. Their response is morally despicable and
will solve nothing, but it should not be all that difficult to
fathom.
There is also something new about what is going on. Great powers
have long taken advantage of weaker societies, but today, the
weak are sometimes able to hit back at the great power’s
homeland. Britain, France, Belgium, and other countries used to
treat their colonial subjects in brutal and sometimes murderous
ways, but the colonized peoples had no way to attack their
colonial masters back in the imperial heartland. Today, groups
like al Qaeda and the Islamic State can do just that, no matter
how many precautions we take. That is the new reality we are now
struggling to absorb.
No. 4. The Islamic State has a strategy. Don’t fall for
it.
The Islamic State and other terrorist groups are motivated by
their own combination of anger, ideology, and ambition, but their
actions are not a symptom of purposeless rage. As I’ve
argued elsewhere
, as have other experts
, the Islamic State uses violence in a highly strategic
fashion. Along with the recent bombings in Ankara and Beirut, and
the attack on the Russian airliner filled with tourists —
tragedies believed to be linked to the Islamic State — the
Paris assault appears to be the Islamic State’s response
to its recent territorial losses and the slowly growing coalition
against it, which includes France. Its leaders are trying to show
anti- Islamic State countries that there is a price for trying to
take it down.
The Islamic State also has a long-term strategic objective. It
seeks to consolidate territorial control in Syria and Iraq and
then expand its so-called “caliphate” throughout
the Muslim world and beyond. To do that, its ideologues want to
sharpen the conflict
between Muslims and others and force
people in the middle (i.e., the “gray zone”) to
choose sides. To do this, the Islamic State hopes to provoke
responses that will reinforce its narrative of irreconcilable
religious conflict and attract even more sympathizers to its
bloodstained banner. If the Islamic State can get France and
other countries to crack down on their Muslim citizens and also
get the West to reoccupy large swaths of the Middle East, then
its false narrative about the West’s deep and intrinsic
antipathy to Islam will gain more credence, as will its carefully
cultivated image as the staunchest defender of Islam today.
Our challenge is to defeat that strategy, and step one is not to
fall into the obvious trap the Islamic State has set. If we buy
into its vision of relentless cultural, religious, and
civilizational conflict, we could easily act in ways that make
its vision a reality. Given how weak the Islamic State is today,
the last thing we should do is encourage anyone to see it as
heroic or farsighted.
No. 5: Keep calm and carry on.
The obvious temptation in the wake of such an attack is to
mobilize an all-out effort
to destroy the Islamic
State. The argument goes like this: If the Islamic State has
indeed shifted from focusing exclusively on local operations and
is now actively organizing attacks in Europe and elsewhere, then
all bets are off and any and all measures are warranted.
Specifically, let’s round up a “coalition of the
willing” and send a new expeditionary force to both Iraq
and Syria and aim to kill as many jihadis as possible in the hope
of destroying the Islamic State once and for all.
An all-out campaign of this sort would surely weaken the Islamic
State, deny it the freedom to plan more attacks, and thus
diminish it as a direct threat to the West. But it would not
solve the problem in the end and could easily make it worse. If
the United States, France, and its allies launch yet another
hastily planned crusade into the Middle East, the Islamic
State’s broader message will appear to be vindicated and
more people will see these terrorists as heroic martyrs standing
up to the eternally hostile forces of the West. Furthermore, the
invading forces will not find these areas any easier to govern or
pacify than they were when the United States had more the 150,000
troops on the ground. Even if the Islamic State itself was
utterly destroyed, its ideas would remain potent and some of its
cadres would scatter to any number of places in the region. The
Islamic State might be gone, but new terrorist groups would
surely spring up in this turbulent and troubled region.
The only long-term remedy to this danger — and remember
the solution will never be total — is the restoration of
more legitimate and effective state institutions in these
regions. But as we have now seen repeatedly, creating the
necessary institutions is not something an invading army can do,
especially not one as tainted by history as the forces of the
West. It can be done only by the people who live in these areas,
and not by us. And that is why the main effort to deal with the
Islamic State must be carried out by local actors, with the
United States (and France) remaining as far in the background as
possible. If our post-9/11 track record is any indication,
however, we’ll probably do the exact opposite.